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THE most significant event in the development of Texas family law during
the past year was the legislative completion of the Family Code. Title 1
(Husband and Wife), enacted in 1969 and slightly amended in 1971, was
further amended in minor particulars. Title 2 (Parent and Child) consti-
tutes a major revision of existing statutory law and contains many new pro-
visions, including an effective means of termination of the parent-child re-
lationship and significant innovations in adjective law. The amendments to
title 1 became effective January 1, 1974, as did the provisions of title 2
with the proviso that proceedings to modify orders affecting the parent-child
relationship entered prior to that time will be treated as new suits.' Title
3 (Juvenile Delinquency), dealing with the unruly child, contains a num-
ber of significant innovations in that regard. It became effective September
1, 1973. Since these statutory provisions will be dealt with in detail else-
where,2 only passing reference will be made to particular provisions here.
As though the profession, bench and bar alike, was preoccupied with com-
pletion of the Family Code, there has been relatively little significant case
law during the period under review.
11. SPOUSES
A. Status
The year was not an eventful one for judicial developments with respect
to marital status, at least insofar as embellishment of the established rules
of marriage was concerned.3 The most striking cases relating to the marital
union were those which dealt with its inception or disruption, and many were
marked with overtones of crime. The Dallas court of civil appeals held that
the adoption of the amendment to the Texas Constitution providing that
equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex 4 does
not in any way affect the action for breach of promise of marriage, since
the action is available to males and females equally. 5 In Felsenthal v. Mc-
* B.A., University of Texas; B.C.L., M.A., Oxford University; LL.M., Columbia
University. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1. See Act of June 15, 1973, ch. 543, § 4(b), [1973] Tex. Laws 1459.
2. See 5 TEX. TECH L. REV. No. 2 (1974), an entire issue devoted to the Texas
Family Code, including a section-by-section commentary on all three titles.
3. To be sure, there were the usual factual disputes with respect to evidence of
informal marriages, but nothing of any consequence to note. See Gary v. Gary, 490
S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973), error ref. n.r.e.; Rey v. Rey, 487 S.W.2d
245 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972); Malone v. Treadville, 487 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1972).
4. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a; see Comment, Is the Texas Equal Rights Amendment
the Answer?, 15 So. TEx. L.J. 111 (1974).
5. Scanlon v. Crim, 500 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973), error ref.
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Millan,6 a case of first impression, the Supreme Court of Texas declared
by way of dictum in a five-to-four decision that the tort of criminal conver-
sation is a part of the common law of Texas which should be extended to
married women as a matter of equal protection. The court also pointed
out that the tort of criminal conversation not only supplies civil recovery
for adultery but also for rape. 7 Though the question of the wife's right to
sue for loss of consortium has never 'been before our supreme court, the
cause of action was precluded prior to the enactment of section 3a by a
court of civil appeals.8 Future development is indicated by Felsenthal and
by a Pennsylvania decision recognizing extension of the right to married
women as the result of Pennsylvania's enactment of a constitutional amend-
ment similar to that adopted in Texas in 1972.9
In Coulter v. Melady10 relatives of a deceased woman sought to annul
her alleged marriage of less than three months on the ground of a lack of
consent (or failure of a meeting of the minds in formulating a marriage con-
tract) indicated by her standing mute at a marriage ceremony entered into
after the usual medical examination and procurement of a license to marry.
It seems to have been the plaintiffs' contention that the marriage was in
its nature void, though not so defined by statute, and, hence, subject to being
declared void after the death of one of the purported spouses." The Tex-
arkana court of civil appeals nevertheless treated the marriage as merely
voidable under the circumstances and subject to the provisions of section
2.47 of the Family Code that preclude dissolution of a voidable marriage
after death of one of the spouses. The court found consent to marry as
a matter of law in the knowing compliance of the alleged wife in the medical
examination process, procurement of the marriage license, and participation
in the marriage ceremony itself. The court was at pains to point out that
n.r.e. For affirmative impact of § 3a with respect to child custody, see Perkins v. Free-
man, 501 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973), error granted.
6. 493 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 1973).
7. It has been suggested that the tort of criminal conversation should be abolished
by statute. If it is, the remedy for rape should be preserved.
Civil recovery for conduct allegedly constituting the crime of barratry was sought
by a former wife against her former husband in Payne v. Laughlin, 486 S.W.2d 192
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972). The former wife claimed that her former husband
had stirred up a suit against her by a married woman for alienation of the woman's
husband's affection. The former wife's pleadings and proof, however, fell short of sa-
tisfying the trial or appellate courts of the actionability of her cause.
Two workmen's compensation cases arose out of criminal violence causing death to
an employee. In Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Upton, 492 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1973), the employee was killed by her former husband at her place of em-
ployment. The claim on behalf of the decedent's children was rejected, inter alia, be-
cause the victim's death was the result of personal relations between her and her assail-
ant and did not originate in the work of the employer. In Commercial Standard Ins.
Co. v. Marin, 488 S.W.2d 8,61 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1972), error ref. n.r.e.,
however, the victim was raped and murdered when opening her employer's business.
The court held that her death was the result of an injury sustained in the course of
employment. There was no hint of any prior relationship between the employee and
her murderer.
8. Garrett v. Reno Oil Co., 271 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1954),
error ref. n.r.e.
9. Hopkins v. Blanco, 224 Pa. Super. 116, 302 A.2d 855 (1973).
10. 489 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
11. Tux. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.47 (Supp. 1973).
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though the Family Code does not list want of consent as rendering a mar-
riage void or voidable, "free consent and agreement of the parties is essential
to a valid ceremonial marriage' 2  It is therefore suggested that some cir-
cumstances might be imagined by which a marriage may be void or voidable
for reasons other than those set out in the Code.
A means of attack on a subsequent marriage, not specifically alluded to
by the Code, is the suit to set aside a prior divorce as invalid. In Miller
v. Miller'3 the first wife of a decedent brought suit through a next friend
in the nature of a bill of review against the decedent's second wife as ad-
ministratrix of his estate. The first wife asserted that she had been mentally
incompetent when her husband sued for divorce, that she had not been
served with process, and that she did not have a guardian ad litem appointed
for her.14 The second wife sought to intervene in her individual capacity
as his widow, and her right to do so was sustained as that of an indispens-
able party to the suit to set aside the divorce.
The long-awaited recognition of an enforceable right of spouse-support as
an incident of Texas marriage came by way of a reason given for rejecting
a three-judge court to consider the constitutionality of the Texas county-resi-
dence requirement for divorce. 15 'Prior to the enactment of Family Code
section 4.02, no right of spouse-support existed in Texas unless ordered by
a court pending divorce, or as might have 'been prompted by criminal sanc-
tion or by pledge of the non-supporting spouse's credit for supplying neces-
saries. Section 4.0216 states that each spouse has the duty to support the
other, though there is a different standard imposed with respect to each. The
section is so drafted that it is not clear whether its second sentence provides
an independent cause of action for spouse-support or is merely repetitive
of earlier law with respect to the duty to compensate third persons who pro-
vide necessaries to a spouse.' 7 Judge Mahon's reasoning is the first judicial
authority for a literal reading of the second sentence in favor of the first
alternative.' 8
Texas conflict of laws rules regard a suit for divorce as quasi-in-rem, and
a Texas domiciliary may proceed against a spouse of foreign nationality and
domicile.' 9 In Dosamantes v. Dosamantes20 the husband, a Mexican citizen
12. 489 S.W.2d at 158.
13. 487 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
14. Cf. Clarady v. Mills, 431 S.W.2d 63 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1968), in which the husband was held to be entitled 'to maintain a divorce action
against his mentally ill wife provided a guardian ad litem was appointed to represent
her.
15. Hughes v. Briscoe, Civil No. CA 3-6985-E (N.D. Tex., Aug. 6, 1973). The
residence requirement is found in TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.21 (Supp. 1973).
16. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.02 (Supp. 1973).
17. The second sentence states: "The husband has the duty to support the wife,
and the wife has the duty to support the husband when he is unable to support him-
self." Id.
18. The section was deliberately drawn to define liability for support in terms of
duty rather than in terms of property as was previously the case. McKnight, The 1967
Recodification and Revision of the Matrimonial Property Law of Texas, 6 NEWSLETTER
OF THE REAL ESTATE, PROBATE AND TRsT LAW SECTION No. 1, Nov. 1967, at 9.
19. This is a matter of very considerable concern in in-ternational affairs and one
with which the proposed international convention with respect 'to divorce will effec-
[Vol. 28
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domiciled in Mexico, sued for divorce in Mexico. The wife, an American
citizen domiciled in Texas, was served with notice in Texas. Thereafter she
commenced a divorce action in Texas. Since the marital res was sub judice,
considerations of comity should have allowed the proceeding first filed to
go to judgment if pleaded in bar of the second suit. The second suit, how-
ever, went to judgment, and the Texas court lost jurisdiction of it before
the husband appeared to contest jurisdiction in the wife's Texas suit. The
husband's bill of review to set aside the Texas decree was denied. Though
the court concluded that the husband had not been properly served in the
wife's proceeding under rules 106 and 108,21 his failure to plead and prove
a meritorious defense foreclosed his bill of review.
A really significant question of divorce jurisdiction continues to be liti-
gated with respect to the constitutionality of a mandatory period of habita-
tion within ,a state or county before the court can exercise its power of dis-
solution. Texas has long maintained statutory requirements of durational
habitation both with respect to domicile within the state and residence within
the county in which the proceeding is filed. 22 As regards county residence,
it has long been the settled Texas rule that the requirement is not jurisdic-
tional but rather merely a prerequisite to judicial action when brought to
the attention of the court.23 When the county residence requirement was
recently attacked on federal constitutional grounds, the federal court refused
to convene a three-judge court to consider the matter.24 But as pointed out
in Wilson v. Wilson,25 residence in this sense must 'be more than merely no-
tional, though brief periods of non-residence may occur without interrupting
the residence period. A different test may be applicable to domicile. 26
There is now a national dispute with respect to whether states may consti-
tutionally require a durational period for measuring domicile, and in turn,
whether domicile itself is a jurisdictional requirement for dissolution of mar-
riage which can properly be imposed by the states. Disputes with respect
to the first question have been recently adjudicated in a number of states.27
tively deal once ratified. See Dyer, The Hague Conventions on Family Law, 7 NEWS-
LETTER OF THE FAMILy LAW SECTION No. 2, Apr. 1973, at 4, 6.
20. 500 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973), error dismissed.
21. TEX. R. Civ. P. 106, 108.
22. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.21 (Supp. 1973) requires, as of Jan. 1, 1974, six
months' domicile within the state and 90 days' residence within the county, whereas
one year and six months respectively were previously required.
23. See Schreiner v. Schreiner, 502 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1973), error dismissed.
24. Hughes v. Briscoe, Civil No. CA 3-6985-E (N.D. Tex., Aug. 6, 1973).
25. 494 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973), error dismissed.
26. See Shankles v. Shankles, 445 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1969),
noted in McKnight & Raggio, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J.
34, 35 (1971).
27. State durational domicile requirements upheld: Sosna v. Iowa, 360 F. Supp.
1182 (N.D. Iowa 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3457 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1974) (No.
73-762); Shiffman v. Askew, 359 F. Supp. 1225 (N.D. Fla. 1973); Davis v. Davis, 210
N.W.2d 221 (Minn. 1973). State requirements declared unconstitutional: McCoy v.
South Dakota, 366 F. Supp. 1244 (D.S.D. 1973); Larsen v. Gallogly, 361 F. Supp. 305
(D.R.I. 1973); Au v. Lum, 360 F. Supp. 219 (D. Hawaii 1973). See also Short, What
Constitutes Residence or Domicile Within a State by a Citizen of Another Countryfor Purpose of Jurisdiction in Divorce, 51 A.L.R.3d 223 (1973).
1974]
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Although the courts had seemingly already disposed of it,28 the legislature
removed any doubt of the demise of the defense of adultery as of January
1, 1974.29 The courts also considered other small, though nevertheless sig-
nificant, ancillary points with respect to divorce practice. Waiver of jury
trial does not preclude the right of such trial on remand in a divorce mat-
ter.80 Standing alone, an amount in controversy of less than $100 does not
give jurisdiction for appeal with regard to costs.3 ' As grounds for a bill
of review there must be a showing of a meritorious defense32 and a showing
of fraud or like cause preventing -the presentation of that defense.33 Two
cases dealt with alleged professional misconduct as grounds for review. In
one case3 4 the husband asserted as his grounds for bill of review the with-
drawal of his counsel without adequate notice and his lack of knowledge
concerning the trial until receipt of a copy of the decree. In the confused
state of the facts and pleadings, the appellate court concluded that the com-
plainant had failed in his proof of the facts alleged as grounds of his lack
of fault, quite apart from his failure to show a meritorious defense. In the
other case3" the wife's bill of review was founded on the fault or negligence
of her attorney in forgetting to file an answer. The court held that she could
not rely on this apparent slip of her agent as a 'basis for her equitable pro-
ceeding.
The latest statistics of the Texas Civil Judicial Council do not indicate
any significant increase in the divorce rate that may have been attributable
to a relaxation of the grounds for divorce. 6
B. Characterization of Marital Property3 7
The simplest type of characterization problem may be resolved by tracing
-- showing that property existing at the termination of the marital relation-
ship constituted a mutation of separate estate, thereby rebutting the pre-
28. See Cusack v. Cusack, 491 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1973), error dismissed. See also McKnight & 'Raggio, supra note 26, at 36-37.
29. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.09(b) (Supp. 1973).
30. Harding v. Harding, 485 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1972).
31. McIsaac v. McIsaac, 488 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1972), error dismissed.
32. Dosamantes v. Dosamantes, 500 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1973), error dismissed.
33. Bohn v. Bohn, 498 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973),
error dismissed; Innmon v. Mouser, 493 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973).
34. Blancas v. Blancas, 495 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973).
35. Swearingen v. Swearingen, 487 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1972), error dismissed.
36. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE TEXAS CIVIL JUDICIAL COUNCIL FOR 1972, at 185
(1973). For comments on the ground of insupportability, see Renfro v. Renfro, 497
S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973); Cusack v. Cusack, 491 S.W.2d 714 (Tex.
Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1973), error dismissed; McKibbin v. McKibbin, 488 S.W.2d
541 (Tex. Civ. App-San Antonio 1972).
37. As pointed out in Smith, Book Review, 36 TEx. B.J. 72 (1973), there is still
"a crying need for a comparative study of marital rights in the community property
states" in spite of the appearance of two recent books that deal with the subject.
Though about one-third of I. BAXTER, MARITAL PROPERTY (1973) is devoted to com-
munity property, it does not fill the need. The research behind it is markedly deriva-
tive and was somewhat out-of-date by the time of publication. W. DEFUNIAK & M.
VAUGHAN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY (2d ed. 1971) constitutes the most
modest revision of 1 W. DEFUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY (1943).
[Vol. 28
FAMILY LAW
sumption of community. 38 In McKinley v. McKinley8" a declaratory judg-
ment proceeding was brought in district court by the surviving wife for ad-
judication that two savings certificates were the community property of her
and her late husband. In the probate of the husband's estate the executor
had termed the certificates separate property. No question had been raised
with respect to the probate court's approval of the executor's inventory.
40
The court's handling of the two savings certificates presents a good illustra-
tion of the operation of the -tracing doctrine. With respect to one of the
certificates the separate character of a specific part of it was clearly demon-
strated. It had been bought from the proceeds of a savings account in which
separate property was initially deposited. The decedent had on one occa-
sion withdrawn an amount equal to the total interest paid on the account
up until that time. The court treated this act as leaving only separate prop-
erty in the account. Two years later the decedent withdrew virtually all
of the money from the savings account (including then-accrued interest).
These funds along with other assets were used to purchase a savings certifi-
cate. Though a small sum of money was left in the savings account, the
court treated the separate portion of the certificate as equal to the amount
of separate property originally deposited in the savings account. But by dis-
regarding the sum left in the savings account, the court's characterization
of separate and community character of the sums withdrawn on the two oc-
casions of withdrawal is inconsistent. In the case of the second certificate,
since more than half of the sum used to purchase it was demonstrably com-
munity and the rest was not capable of characterization as separate property,
the court treated it as community as presumed in law.
In a somewhat unusual context a federal court applied the tracing prin-
ciple and the doctrine that recovery for certain personal injury is separate
property as enunciated in Graham v. Franco.41 In Martin v. General Elec-
tric Co.42 the husband brought suit for extensive personal injury. Prior to
judgment in that action the husband also filed suit for divorce. Thereafter
the wife was joined as a party in the husband's personal injury action in
order to determine the community element in the recovery for purposes of
38. For example, capital profits distributed on separate stocks in a mutual fund
constitutes separate property. Bakken v. Bakken, 503 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1973).
39. 496 S.W.2d 540 (Tex. 1973).
40. In response to the executor's jurisdictional argument, the Texas Supreme Court
held that the district court had concurrent jurisdiction with the probate court to declare
the rights under a will and relief was, therefore, properly sought in the district court
under the declaratory judgments act. Further, -the "order of the probate court approv-
ing an inventory and appraisement is not an adjudication of title to property." Id. at
542. But under the 1973 amendment to the Texas Constitution with respect to concur-
rent jurisdiction of the district and probate courts, TEX. CONsT. art. V, § 8, and the
implementing legislation passed in 1973, TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5 (Supp. 1974), in
the future the statutory probate courts will handle such disputes in those counties hav-
ing such courts.
41. 488 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1972), discussed in McKnight, Matrimonial Property,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 27-29 (1973), and Smith, Family Law,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 45, 53-55 (1973). See also Comment, Re-
classification of Tort Recoveries by Spouses-Possible Effects of Graham v. Franco,
4 TEXAS TECH L. REv. 359 (1973).
42. Civil No. 7487 (E.D. Tex., filed Nov. 27, 1973).
1974]
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the divorce proceeding. The court found that sixty percent of the husband's
recovery was attributable to his bodily loss, thirty percent to loss of wages,
earnings, and earning capacity during his life expectancy of twenty-eight
years, and ten percent to future medical expenses.
If community property is not dealt with by a divorce court, it becomes a
,tenancy in common of the former spouses. In Dessommes v. Dessommes4
the former wife asserted ,an interest in the husband's retirement benefits un-
divided on divorce. After the divorce the former husband continued to aug-
ment the fund and the prior retirement plan was superseded by a new one
under which the ex-husband was entitled to an annuity when he
subsequently retired. The trial court granted an instructed verdict for the
husband. Reversing and remanding, the appellate court first observed that
the oversight of the divorce court left the spouses with a tenancy in com-
mon. The court stated that
when 'the proportions contributed by several owners to a common fund
cannot be established and the equities are equal, the owners must be
considered equal tenants in common. . . . [But] the circumstances
shown here justify imposing on the former husband the burden to es-
tablish the portion of -the commingled retirement fund attributable to
contributions since the divorce. . . . One of the recognized principles
in determining the burden is to place it on the party having peculiar
knowledge of the facts to be proved. . . . [I]f the parties are shown
to have been .the equal owners of a fund at a certain time, and one of
them is shown to have made additions to that fund in an undetermined
amount, the party who made the additions should have the burden to
show the amount of the additions. 44
On motion for rehearing, however, the ex wife argued that
since the parties were married when the employee's interest vested, that
interest was community property, just as if it were a tract of land then
acquired, and contributions either after the divorce or before the mar-
-riage would not affect the parties' equal ownership, although she con-
cede[d] 'that on proper pleading and proof the former husband would
have the right to reimbursement for enhancement resulting from con-
tribution after divorce. 45
The court did not agree. It found that the characterization of the benefits
as community property -under the doctrine of inception of title would not
do substantial justice and the benefits should be apportioned to the former
spouses by recognizing the accrual of interests before, during, and after the
marriage. The court recognized that Busby v. Busby 46 presented some diffi-
culty in this regard but concluded that "the law on this point cannot be re-
garded as settled . . . ,,47 A better result would be achieved by following
43. 505 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973), error ref. n.r.e., a sequel to
Dessommes v. Dessommes, 461 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970), noted in
McKnight & Raggio, supra note 26, al. 41.
44. 505 S.W.2d at 679.
45. Id. at 681.
46. 457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1970).
47. 505 S.W.2d at 681.
[Vol. 28
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Busby and leaving the spouses to any rights of reimbursement they might
have rather than pursuing an apportionment approach in derogation of the
doctrine of inception of title.
But if no right vests during marriage, there is no interest subject to divi-
sion. Davis v. Davis48 also involved retirement benefits, but in that case
their division in the divorce proceeding itself was in issue. The military re-
tirement rights of the husband were in no sense vested prior to divorce and
could not have become vested under normal circumstances until the husband
performed about twelve additional years of military service.49 Distinguishing
Miser v. Miser,50 where it had approved an order prospectively dividing re-
tirement benefits when only a relatively short period remained before the
,right to the benefits would vest, the Dallas court of civil appeals reversed
the trial court's order dividing the retirement benefit "when and if" they
should become vested on the ground that there was no vested community
interest to divide. The court put some emphasis on the statement in the
dissenting opinion in Busby "that the 'right' of a member or former member
of the armed forces to retirement benefits that are payable in the future,
resting as it does on a statute that is subject to modification or repeal at
any time, does not constitute property." 51
The related question of property vel non with respect to agricultural acre-
age allotments was again an issue in In re Adams.52  In this case the issue
was whether the allotment passed to a bankrupt's trustee. The court con-
cluded that as a property interest transferable by the bankrupt under section
70(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Act5" it would, provided that it did not consti-
tute exempt property. 4  The issue was, therefore, somewhat different
from that faced by the courts in other recent cases involving agricultural
acreage allotments where the courts have reached somewhat different con-
clusions. 55
Texas spouses may freely partition their community estate as interests in
separate property, but an involuntary partition is not available to one or the
48. 495 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973), error dismissed.
49. In In re McCurdy, 489 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973), error
dismissed, it is not clear whether similar facts were before the court. If the facts were
similar, a contrary conclusion was reached.
California authorities agree with the decision in Davis. See French v. French, 17
Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941); In re Wilson, 32 Cal. App. 3d 546, 108 Cal. Rptr.
371 (1973). But the question has been raised whether military retirement benefi-ts can
be properly characterized as community property at all. See Goldberg, Is Armed Serv-
ices Retired Pay Really Community Property?, 48 CAL. STATE B.J. 12 (1973). See
also Comment, The Unsettled Question of the Military Pension: Separate or Commu-
ity Property?, 8 CAL. W.L. REV. 522 (1972). For a California case in which an attor-
ney was sued for malpractice in failing to consider pension rights in settling a divorce
case, see Smith v. Lewis, 31 Cal. App. 3d 677, 107 Cal. Rptr. 95 (1973).
50. 475 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971), error dismissed, discussed in
McKnight, supra note 44, at 30-31.
51. 457 S.W.2d at 555 (Walker, J., dissenting).
52. 3157 F. Supp. 1184 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
53. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) (1970).
54. Act of May 6, 1935, ch. 145, [1935] Tex. Laws 384 (repealed by TEx. REv.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3836(a)(2) (Supp. 1974)). On remand the court rejected the
argument that the allotment was an implement of husbandry and, therefore, exempt.




other. No attack has as yet been made on this rule on constitutional
grounds. A recent federal case involving a tenancy ,by the entireties suggests
that such an attack would fail.5 Though the revised marriage contract stat-
ute has not been before a Texas appellate court, the old article 461057 was
again commented on in Weaver v. Citizens National Bank.58 The dispute
arose out of what seems to have been a rather curious estate plan. The
husband and wife, owning only community estate, executed formal wills on
the same day, but there was no evidence of their contractual nature. The
husband's will, dealing with his share of the community, created a trust with
the wife as life beneficiary and remainders. The wife's will left her entire
estate to her husband. At the time the wills were executed the wife also
executed what was referred to in its context as an "agreement" that her in-
terest in the community estate should become part of the trust created by
her husband's will and that she would take all necessary steps to achieve
this result after admission of her husband's will to probate. The husband
died in 1968 and his wife survived him until 1971, at which time the hus-
band's trustee learned of his will, which had not been admitted to probate.
The sole issue before the court was whether the wife's agreement was valid
and hence caused her share of the community estate to pass into the hus-
band's testamentary trust. The court concluded that the agreement was in-
valid as in conflict with the provisions of old article 4610 and the case law
construing it that made agreements between husband and wife during mar-
riage, as well as before, invalid if for the purpose of altering the order of
descent. The instrument executed by the wife was, at most, evidence of
an agreement between her and her husband not executed with formalities
required of a testamentary disposition. It is unclear what the draftsman
and the parties had in mind in executing the three documents referred to.
It may have been anticipated that the wife would destroy her will if she
survived her husband and would probate her husband's will and deliver the
previously executed agreement as an assignment of her share of the com-
munity to his trustee. One wonders why the scheme was not carried out
and whether it was anticipated that the agreement would be destroyed had
the husband survived the wife. An assignment of property to an entity such
as the husband's trust to come into effect on probate might fail because of
its tentative nature, but apart from that reason, if the agreement had been
couched in terms of assignment (rather -than a unilateral declaration of
agreement to assign) in consideration of the provisions made for the wife
under the husband's will, nothing in old article 4610 indicates that an assign-
ment should not have been given effect. 9
Another post mortem dispute; as to characterization of matrimonial prop-
56. Klein v. Mayo, 367 F. Supp. 583 (D. Mass. 1973).
57. Act of Jan. 20, 1840, § 5, [1840] Tex. Laws 5, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS
179 (1898) (repealed 19,69).
58. 490 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973).
59. Two foreign cases dealt with the effects of antenuptial agreements on the right
of support. One involved the husband's right, Higgason v. Higgason, 10 Cal. 3d 476,
516 P.2d 289, 110 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1973), and the other that of the wife to support
pendente lite. Belcher v. Belcher, 271 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1972).
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erty occurred in Carriere v. Bodungen.60 The court rightly refused to attach
any importance to the fact that the testator denied in his will that he owned
any separate property other than things so identified. With respect to other
property that was clearly separate, the court passed it to the residuary takers
in spite of the recital. The case also exemplifies the well-known rule that
if a husband buys property with his separate estate and takes title either
partly or wholly in the wife's name, a gift to the wife has been achieved. 61
C. Division on Divorce
The appellate courts were twice called upon to say that a prayer for gen-
eral relief was sufficient to empower a court to make a complete division
of the matrimonial estate of the parties.6 2  The broad power of the court
in making discretionary division of matrimonial property was repeatedly
stressed.63  There was no further discussion of the construction of section
3.63 of the Family Code with respect to the court's power to divest title
to separate realty. 64 But several broad dicta supported its literal interpreta-
tion.65 With respect to a foreign decree of divorce making a division of
Texas realty, a Houston court of civil appeals concluded that the judgment
is not subject to collateral attack in Texas.66
The most significant cases dealing with division of matrimonial property
on divorce were those dealing with vested retirement benefits. In Dessom-
60. 500 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1973).
61. See McKnight, supra note 55, at 33 n.47.
62. Schreiner v. Schreiner, 502 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973),
error dismissed; Zaruba v. Zaruba, 498 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi
1973), error dismissed.
63. Reaney v. Reaney, 505 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974) (award of
virtually all the community property to the wife as well as her attorney's fee and a
money judgment against the husband to compensate for profligate loss of the commun-
ity estate without any substantial award to the husband); Womble v. Womble, 502
S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973) (husband required to execute a note
in favor of the wife to achieve an equitable division; for tax consequences, see Sho-
walter, CCH Tax. Ct. Mem. 32,462,(M) (1974)); Peterson v. Peterson, 502 S.W.2d
178 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1973) (dealing both with division of prop-
erty and award of costs and attorney's fees); Hensley v. Hensley, 496 S.W.2d 929(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973); Brunell v. Brunell, 494 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Dallas 1973) (granting the wife a money judgment for her interest in the homestead
and the amount of her attorney's fees with a judgment lien on the homestead to secure
the interest therein only and denying any recovery to her for delinquent temporary ali-
mony and child support payments).
64. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Supp. 1973); see McKnight, supra note 55, at
38-39. The legislature considered but did not pass H.B. 102 to reinstate in § 3.63 the
second sentence of old art. 4638, Act of Jan. 6, 1841, § 4, [1841] Tex. Laws 20, 2
H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 484 (1898) (repealed 1969).
65. Harrison v. Harrison, 495 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973) (separate
property was given to its owner and the community property was divided equitably);
In re McCurdy, 489 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo .1973), error dismissed(there was apparently no separate property to divide); Medearis v. Medearis, 487 S.W.2d
198 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972) (separate property was given to its owner and the
community property was divided equitably). In McCurdy the trial court found con-
structive fraud on the wife in the husband's making a susbtantial diversion of commun-
ity funds as a gift for a minor child. In that there was a conflict of testimony as
to the wife's knowledge of the transfer prior to its completion, the appellate court sus-
-tained the trial court's handling of the attempted gift.
66. Forman v. Forman, 496 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1973); cf. McElreath v. McElreath, 162 Tex. 190, 345 S.W.2d 722 (1961).
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mes v. Dessommes67 it was concluded that a divorce decree providing that
each spouse keep "the property now in the possession of such party" did
not cover a spouse's vested interest in a retirement fund giving the spouse
control over the equitable interest in the fund through the exercise of var-
ious options including the right to determine the time of retirement, to
change the beneficiary of death benefits, and to convert the interest to a
policy of life insurance. "Possession" as that word was used in the decree
could not properly be interpreted as "including such intangible contract
rights as these. The term is ordinarily understood as referring to property
over which the parties have physical control or, at least, a power of immedi-
ate enjoyment and disposition."6 1
In other cases involving retirement benefits, the trial courts exercised their
discretion (in those cases which reached the appellate level) in a great vari-
ety of ways: awarding all of the interest in the husband's retirement plans
to him and awarding other property to the wife; 69 dividing the retirement
benefits equally between the husband and wife; 70 apportioning the benefits
between the spouses with a credit for taxes payable by the husband on the
share received by the wife; 71 dividing the property, taking into consideration
an evaluation of the present interest in a military retirement plan from which
payments would be made in the remote future; 72 and awarding a money
judgment to the wife and allocating all of the interest in the retirement plan
to the husband on the basis of its equity value rather than its lesser value
if cancelled prematurely under the husband's employment contract. 73
Though the discretion of the trial court is rarely successfully challenged with
respect to division of marital property, if the trial court exercises its discre-
tion on the basis of erroneous premises of law or fact which causes a signifi-
cantly unjust result,74 reversal of the trial court's judgment will result. In
67. 505 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
68. Id. at 676.
69. Mercer v. Mercer, 503 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973).
70. Gaulding v. Gaulding, 503 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973); Dan-
iels v. Daniels, 490 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973), error dismissed.
71. Troutenko v. Troutenko, 503 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1973).
72. Freeman v. Freeman, 497 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1973). In Freeman the trial judge also awarded the wife real property which was the
principal asset of a corporation which she apparently owned. In dividing the estate
of the parties the court considered the value of the corporate stock independently of
the value of the land and, hence, fell into error; cf. Bell v. Bell, 504 S.W.2d 610 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974), error granted.
73. Maddox v. Maddox, 489 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1973); cf. Taylor v. Taylor, 449 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969), noted
in McKnight & Raggio, supra note 26, at 42. With respect to whether contempt is
an appropriate remedy for the husband's failure to comply with an order to pay a por-
tion of his retirement pay to his former wife, Hamborsky v. Hamborsky, 497 S.W.2d
405 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973), is perhaps misleading. The court did not
hold that civil and criminal contempt would be inappropriate remedies in all cases of
failure to comply with the court's order, but merely that civil contempt is not the
proper remedy if the husband is unable to comply with the proposed order.
74. In Gaulding v. Gaulding, 503 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973),
the appellate court concluded that an error of law was made by the trial court, but
that its effect was harmless. In Freeman v. Freeman, 497 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973), significant errors in valuations were made which re-
quired remand to the trial court.
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Bell v. Bell 75 the trial court characterized the substantially appreciated value
of separate shares of corporations wholly owned by the husband as separate
property and failed to consider their value in dividing the marital property
on divorce. 76 The majority of the Beaumont court of civil appeals termed
this an abuse of discretion. The dissenting judge concluded rather broadly
that the "essence of the holding . . . is that the increase in value of corpo-
rate assets becomes community property ....
Instances are also rarely encountered when the trial court refuses to ap-
prove the spouses' property settlement. In Myers v. Myers7s the appellate
court affirmed the refusal of the trial court to approve the property settle-
ment under circumstances in which the husband successfully resisted efforts
of the wife's attorney to discover the extent of the community estate so that
the trial judge was unable to determine whether the proposed settlement was
fair to the spouses. The result was to leave the husband and wife as tenants
in common as to their former community estate. 79
Resort has also been had to the bankruptcy court in an effort to dis-
charge liability arising under a property settlement agreement. In In re
Smiths° the district court affirmed the conclusion of the bankruptcy judge
that obligations under a property settlement agreement could not be dis-
charged under section 17(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Act.81 The court relied
on California and Missouri authorities in reaching its conclusion. 82 But a
75. 504 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974), error granted.
76. In Harrison v. Harrison, 495 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973), it was
the wife who had a substantial separate estate. "In view of the fact that the trial court
awarded appellant [husband] a substantial part of the community property as well as
a going business enterprise from which he made substantial profits, we are not prepared
to hold that the division was such as to demonstrate that the court failed to consider
the relative wealth of the parties and the relative need of the parties for future support,
so as to constitute an abuse of judicial discretion." Id. at 4.
77. 504 S.W.2d at 613 (Keith, J., dissenting). This extreme view was espoused
by the Fort Worth court of civil appeals in Dillingham v. Dillingham, 434 S.W.2d 459
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968), noted in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey
of Texas Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 49, 52 (1970). The dissenting judge also leaned heavily
on such authorities as Scofield v. Weiss, 131 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1942), and Beals v.
Fontenot, 111 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1940).
78. 503 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973), error dismissed.
79. For an example of protracted litigation with respect to post-divorce problems
involving tenancies in common and fluctuating values of securities, see Lifson v. Dorf-
man, 491 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973), error ref. n.r.e. With respect
to tax questions that may arise in connection with a transmutation of community
property to a tenancy in common, see Hammerstrom v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. No.
21 (1973). The Internal Revenue Service has reiterated its ruling that community
property converted into separate property after 1941 is considered community property
for purposes of determining the marital deduction. Rev. Rul. 73-309, 1973 INT. REV.
BULL. No. 29, at 9. See also Tinio, Divorce or Separation: Consideration of Tax Lia-
bility or Consequences in Determining Alimony or Property Settlement Provisions, 51
A.L.R.3d 461 (1973). Fahrer v. Fahrer, 36 Ohio App. 2d 208, 304 N.E.2d 411
(1973), serves to remind the draftsman of property seAtlement agreements to make
careful provision for any future liaison that might constitute an informal marriage in
Texas if that eventuality is to terminate contractual alimony.
80. No. BK3-2065 (N.D. Tex., July 2, 1973). An earlier stage of the proceeding
was discussed in McKnight, supra note 55, at 42.
81. 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(7) (1970).
82. Related cases have recently come from both those jurisdictions: In re Har-
grove, 3,61 F. Supp. 851 (W.D. Mo. 1973) (award of attorney's fees in a suit to modify
an original divorce decree constitutes "alimony" under Missouri law and was, therefore,
not dischargeable in the husband's bankruptcy); Sloan v. Mitchell, 28 Cal. App. 3d 47,
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money judgment awarded to achieve an equitable division of property83 or
to compensate a spouse for culpable dissipation of the community estate,8 4
or a note given pursuant to a court order to facilitate property division85
would all seem to be dischargeable in ,bankruptcy. In Ex parte Parr86 the
wife had recourse to the bankruptcy court as an apparent strategy to snarl
a pending divorce proceeding.87 Already rankled by her behavior, the trial
judge apparently responded by increasing the wife's punishment for con-
tempt and she responded by bringing an original petition of habeas corpus
to the Texas Supreme Court. The court released her on the ground that
she had not been given fair notice of the grounds for her increased penalty.
D. Management
Two cases raised significant questions of management of community prop-
erty in relation to litigation concerning it. In Dulak v. Dulak8" suit was
brought against the husband to cancel the release of a note made by the
husband and wife given for real property.8 9 The release was given as a
result of undue influence exerted by the husband on the payee. Judgment
was for the plaintiff and one of the husband's points of error on appeal was
that his wife was an indispensable party. The husband's liability seems in-
contestable, but some of the court's general remarks regarding judgments
against the husband or wife cannot go without comment. The court quoted
article 1986 to the effect that "a principal obligor in a contract, may be
sued either alone or jointly with any other party who may be liable
therein"90 and noted that this provision is applicable when a husband and
wife are joint obligors on a note. The court went on, however, to consider
sections 4.04 and 5.22(c)91 of the Family Code, concluding that "the hus-
band and the wife are each the representative of the other with respect to
the community. A judgment against the wife concerning the community
would be binding upon the husband though he was not made a party. Like-
wise, as before, a judgment against the husband concerning the community
would bind the wife though she was not a party." 92 If the court was saying
that a judgment against the spouse who is manager of particular community
property would bind the other spouse's interest in that property, the state-
ment is perfectly accurate. But if the court was suggesting that a judgment
against only one spouse would always bind the community property subject
104 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1972) (support provisions in a property settlement agreement were
not dischargeable in bankruptcy).
83. Weaks v. Weaks, 471 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1971), error dis-
missed.
84. Reaney v. Reaney, 505 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974).
85. Womble v. Womble, 502 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973).
86. 505 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. 1974).
87. For other snarling devices see Davis, Hiding, Diverting and Snarling Marital
Assets in Anticipation of Divorce-And What Can Be Done About It, in INSTITUTE
ON TExAs FAMILY LAW AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY 73 (1973).
88. 496 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973), error granted.
89. It does not appear when -this transaction occurred, but the payee had the note
in his possession in Jan. 1971.
90. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1986 (1964).
91. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 4.04, 5.22(c) (Supp. 1973).
92. 496 S.W.2d at 782.
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to the management of the other spouse or subject to their joint management,
the comment is erroneous, unless the cause of action sounds in tort, in which
event all community property is subject to liability regardless of which
spouse is culpable. 3 The spouse who is not an alleged tortfeasor need not
be joined as a party in order to make that spouse's interest in community
property subject to satisfaction of the judgment. 94
In Cooper v. Texas Gulf Industries95 realty was conveyed to spouses and
a dispute arose between them and the grantor with respect to the sale. The
husband brought suit for rescission of the contract of sale. Thereafter the
husband and wife entered into an agreement with the grantor to cancel a
collateral management contract dealing with the property and the husband's
suit was dismissed with prejudice. The husband and wife later brought an-
other suit for rescission of the sale. Summary judgment was awarded to
the grantor on the ground that the dismissal of the prior suit with prejudice
was a bar to the second suit. The plaintiffs asserted, in turn, that the dis-
missal of the husband's suit could not be a bar to the subsequent suit on
behalf of the wife. The issue was thus whether it was within the power
of one spouse to settle the first suit, and, if so, whether the rights of the
other spouse in the second proceeding were thereby concluded. If the first
proceeding were clearly a matter of community property management (as
all parties appear to have assumed in the court of civil appeals), the prob-
lem would be that of determining the manager. If the property was clearly
community property on the basis of the pleadings and presumptions of law
and there were no fact issues to be resolved in that regard and the sole man-
ager was the husband, dismissal of the first suit at the husband's instance
would seem to bar the second suit. But if the husband and wife together
purchased the real property in their joint names, they would both seem to
have joint powers of management under section 5.22(b). 96
A number of cases dealt with gifts of community property. Murphy v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.97 comes as a sequel to Givens v. Girard
93. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61 (Supp. 1973). A somewhat similar point was
alluded to in Miller v. Cretien, 488 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972),
error ref. n.r.e., where there is a brief discussion of the power to bind an unjoined
spouse-defendant's interest in community homestead. Again, if the spouse sued has
management over the community constituting the homestead, judgment against that
spouse would be sufficient to bind the property if the right in question can be unilater-
ally determined as a matter of homestead law. But if the right of the non-joined
spouse to the homestead is infringed by way of execution on the judgment, the non-joined spouse still has a remedy available.
94. Contra, Maness v. Reese, 489 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972),
error ref. n.r.e. But abstracting a judgment against one spouse will not be constructive
notice against one dealing with the other with respect to property subject to the other's
sole management.
95. 495 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973), error granted.
96. T x. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22(b) (Supp. 1973). See also Phillips v. Teinert,
493 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973), a personal injury action
by a husband and wife in which the husband died between the date of filing and that
of trial. The court held that failure to make the husband's successors parties consti-
tuted fundamental error in spite of the failure of the defendants to raise the point at
trial. Brown, J., dissented. Id. at 586.




Life Insurance Co. of America.98 Shortly before his death and while sep-
arated from his wife, the husband changed the beneficiary of an insurance
policy on his life from his wife to his mother. In Givens the court held
that except in instances when a gift is motivated by a moral obligation owed
to a close relative, the burden of proof is on the donee of community prop-
erty to prove that it was fair under the circumstances. But this was an in-
stance when the donee was a close relative, sixty-four years old and in ne-
cessitous circumstances. The gift of the entire proceeds of the policy
amounted to almost one-sixth of the entire community estate, though the
wife's share did not provide her with a high degree of financial security.
The trial court awarded half of the proceeds to the wife and half to the
mother. The appellate court concluded that decision in favor of the
mother or the wife was supportable by the facts and hence sustained the
trial court's exercise of its discretion in making its award in favor of the
wife.99
The courts continued to wrestle with federal estate and gift tax questions
with respect to interspousal transactions. In Waite v. United States'00 the
federal district court concluded that insurance proceeds on the life of the
decedent were not includable in his estate for estate tax purposes if all his
interest in the community policy had been assigned to the beneficiary.' 0' In
another case 10 2 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the in-
sured husband under a group life insurance policy died possessed of an inci-
dent of ownership in the policy subject to estate tax because he retained
the right to alter the time and manner of enjoyment.10 3  Elsewhere10 4 the
court concluded that the proceeds of a flight insurance policy on the life
of an insured were includable in his gross estate as a transfer in contempla-
tion of death. 0 The purchaser of the policy was in good health and did
not expect to die when he bought the policy just before boarding an airplane
that crashed soon afterward. The court rejected "an expectation of death"
test in favor of the contemplation of death approach previously enunciated.
Though the court attempted to stop short of concluding that the proceeds
of all flight insurance policies taken out shortly before death are in contem-
plation of death, there is no suggestion how an estate tax might be avoided
in such an instance. 0 6 That a taxable gift may be involved in relinquish-
98. 480 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972), error ref. n.r.e., discussed in
McKnight, supra note 41, at 36. See also Comment, Gifts in Fraud of the Rights of
the Wife, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 85 (1974).
99. In In re McCurdy, 489 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973), error
dismissed, the husband's apparently unilateral gift of a substantial amount of commun-
ity property to a minor child was set aside by the divorce court to the extent of an
award of one-half in favor of the wife.
100. 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,951 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
101. Caution is given against too much reliance on this authority, however, in the
light of the terms of the assignment of the interest of the insured and the fact that
the contemplation-of-death problem was not dealt with by the court. Donoghue, Tax-
ation Developments, 11 NEWSLETTER OF REAL ESTATE, PROBATE AND TRUST LAW SEC-
TION, No. 3, Mar. 1973, at 7, 8.
102. Estate of Lumpkin v. Commissioner, 474 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1973).
103. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2042.
104. Berman v. United States, 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,949 (5th Cir. 1973).
105. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2035.
106. But see Skall v. United States, 355 F. Supp. 778 (N.D. Ohio 1972), where the
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ment of the right in a policy on one's life or that of another is incontestable.
The Internal Revenue Service has recently ruled that if a wife owns poli-
cies of insurance on the life of her husband, a "consent of spouse" cannot
be filed by the husband's executor after his death because the spousal rela-
tionship no longer exists. 107
With respect to presumption of death, article 5541108 was amended in
1973 to add to the presumption of death after seven years' absence a pre-
sumption of death when any branch of the armed services issues a death
certificate with respect to a member of the armed forces. 109
E. Liability
Liability with respect to marital property is closely related to its manage-
ment 10 but may be broader in the case of tortious liability. Though the
concept of "community debt" has served some useful purposes,"' its service-
ability as a concept of liability has been badly eroded by the statutory
changes enacted in 1963 and 1967 with respect to the contractual capacity
of married women and the management of community property, respec-
tively. The phrase can now be regarded as generally misleading. To char-
acterize an obligation "a community debt" means nothing more than that
some community property is liable for its satisfaction. The creditor who is
owed a contractual debt must find community property subject to manage-
ment of the spouse who incurred the liability.
In First State Bank v. Tanner 1 2 the court concluded that a wife who main-
tains a joint checking account with her husband is not liable to the bank
in a suit on the husband's endorsement of a check deposited to the account
but later dishonored by the maker. The court relied on old article 5932,
court held that assignments of an inheritance made by an eighty-nine-year-old woman
a year before her death were not made in contemplation of death. See also a discus-
sion of related cases in McKnight, supra note 41, at 33.
107. Rev. Rul. 73-207, 1973-1 CUM. BuLL. 409.
108. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5541 (Supp. 1973).
109. For an analysis of a variety of problems arising with respect to members of
the armed forces missing in action, see Haeussler, Missing in Action, 36 Tax. B.J. 797
(1973).
110. As the Texas Constitutional Convention considers whether to include a provi-
sion in the constitution allowing spouses to create the right of survivorship in commun-
ity property or joint tenancies with rights of survivorship out of community property,
there is no further development in either statutory or case law with respect to -the inci-
dents of a joint tenancy with respect to the rights of creditors. Should such a provision
be inserted in the Texas Constitution, foreign treatment of creditors' rights with respect
to joint tenancies of spouses or tenancies by the entireties might provide guides to the
way ahead. A suggestion was made that the constitution might even allow tenancies
by the entireties. It was pointed'out in Lewis v. United States, 485 F.2d 606 (Ct.
Cl. 1973), that under Pennsylvania law a tenancy by the entirety is immune from
claims of sole creditors of the husband or the wife. As to Virginia law with respect
to tenancies by the entireties, see In re Hawks, 471 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1973). See
also Farmington Production Credit Ass'n v. Estes, 504 S.W.2d 149 (Mo. Ct. App.
1974), to the effect that only a joint judgment against spouses is enforceable against
a tenancy by the entireties.
1.11. For example, in characterizing property acquired on credit in the absence of
an agreement by the seller to look only to the separate estate of the acquiring spouse.
Gleich v. Bongio, 128 Tex. 606, 99 S.W.2d 881 (1937).
112. 495 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973).
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section 18,113 since the wife was not a signatory to the endorsement. Had
the account been community property subject to the joint management of
the spouses, it might have been argued that the wife would be subject to
suit in quasi-contract for the benefit realized by the community subject to
joint management. 114 It is submitted that for a third party creditor to reach
an account held in the joint names of spouses for the debts of each he must
show that the account is subject to joint management as a result of deposit
of community property as defined in section 5.22 of the Family Code,115
not merely as a consequence of an agreement with the bank. The bank,
however, might have an action against the spouse having management rights
in an account on the basis of the agreement with the bank, unless, as Tan-
ner suggests, the specific provisions of the banking law preclude such liabil-
ity.
It has been long established that a division of community property on di-
vorce does not prejudice the rights of creditors to reach property partitioned
to the non-contracting spouse." 6  The protection of creditors was a strong
argument against allowing spouses to partition their community estate during
marriage. 117 When the provision allowing partition was inserted in the con-
stitution, it was provided that rights of pre-existing creditors should not be
infringed. This rule has always been taken to include unsecured as well
as secured creditors. But why this rule should prevail in the absence of
an intent to defraud creditors, actually or constructively entertained, has
never been adequately justified, though the juristic difference between a
transfer and a partition has been offered as a rationalization. It may be
better explained as an extension of the outworn concept of "community
debt." 1 8 Why the constitution should give protection to unsecured creditors
under these circumstances and thus make any partition of community prop-
erty between spouses a constructive fraud on pre-existing unsecured creditors
is difficult to fathom. But that understanding of the rule clearly persists,
as exemplified in Dean v. First National Bank." 9
In Hoffman v. Love 20 it was finally authoritatively determined that the
amount of the homestead exemption on particular property increases from
113. Act of March 24, 1919, ch. 123, § 18, [1913] Tex. Laws 193 (repealed by Act
of June 30, 1965, ch. 721, §§ 10-102, [1966] Tex. Laws v. 2, at 179).
114. An agency theory of liability was suggested and rejected in Conway v. Signal
Oil & Gas Co., 229 Ga. 849, 194 S.E.2d 909 (Ga. 1972), with respect to the wife's
payments of bills incurred by her husband through credit card charges.
115. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22. (Supp. 1973).
116. Boyd v. Ghent, 93 Tex. 543, 57 S.W. 25 (1900); Grandjean v. Runke, 39 S.W.
945 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897).
117. Protzel v. Schroeder, 83 Tex. 684, 19 S.W. 292 (1892); Cox v. Miller, 54 Tex.
16 (1880).
118. For related doctrine in New Mexico, see Moucka v. Windham, 483 F.2d 914(10th Cir. 1973), commented on in 1 COMMUNITY PROP. J. 45 (.1974).
119. 494 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973). As to another aspect of post-
divorce liability, the Ninth Circuit recently concluded that arrearages for child support
might constitute a bad debt for income tax purposes, provided the taxpayer properly
evidenced the amount expended for support. Imeson v. Commissioner, 487 F.2d 319
(9th Cir. 1973). Under the new provision of the TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.09(c)
(Supp. 1973) one might anticipate that the Internal Revenue Service would argue that
the arrears for child support must also be first reduced to judgment.
120. 494 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973), error ref. n.r.e. (per curiam).
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the time of designation as homestead in the same proportion as the actual
value of the land increases from that time. At the time the property was
impressed with homestead character the value of the urban lot was $12,250.
At the time the lot was sold it was worth $36,750. In the meantime a judg-
ment of approximately $34,000 had been abstracted against the homestead
claimant. Throughout the entire period the homestead exemption was
$5,000. It was concluded that the lot was exempt in the proportion that
$5,000 bears of $12,250 so that 20/49ths of the total remained constantly
exempt. The court allowed the purchaser to assert this homestead claim
of his predecessor in title. But further mathematical complications would
have arisen if the sale had occurred after the exemption was increased to
$10,000 on December 13, 1970, a problem that still remains to be resolved.
The impact of prior homestead status on a subsequent purchaser was also
considered in Julian v. Andrews.12 ' During marriage judgments were ren-
dered and abstracted against the husband. The husband abandoned his
wife who continued to assert her homestead claim, and in their divorce
the property was awarded to her. The property was subsequently sold and
the buyer later contracted to resell it. On discovery of the alleged cloud
on the title created by the abstract of judgment, the contracting purchaser
brought a suit for specific performance or an award of damages, and a coun-
terclaim for specific performance was asserted by the seller. In rendering
judgment for the seller against the buyer, the court concluded that the wife's
homestead claim had never been lost and, therefore, the abstract of judg-
ment never fixed any lien upon the property.
[A] husband has no right to abandon any homestead in fraud of or
prejudice to his wife pursuant to action against her matrimonial right.
It is only where the husband is, or is supposed to be, the head of the
family that he has the right to select or abandon a 'homestead.' Where
he abandons and disclaims his status as such he might have effected an
abandonment insofar as his own right should pertain; but it does not
follow that insofar as the wife's right is involved, absent her independent
act of abandonment, that there would necessarily be an accompanying
forfeiture of her homestead right. When one spouse dies the fact of his
death does not operate to deprive the survivor of a homestead right
theretofore existent, and the same thing is true as applied to the home-
stead where the husband has abandoned his wife and left the premises
with intent never to return. 122
This view of unilateral abandonment extracts a good deal of the sting from
such authorities as Marler v. Handy 28 and makes considerably less vital the
language adopted as a constitutional amendment to the effect that both
spouses must join in abandoning the homestead in accordance with statutory
standards. 124
121. 491 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973).
122. Id. at 726-27. See also Prince v. North State Bank, 484 S.W.2d 405, 412 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972). Abandonment of the homestead by both spouses cures
lack of joinder in a homestead conveyance. Pollard v. State, 484 S.W.2d 387 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1972).
123. 88 Tex. 421, 31 S.W. 636 (1895).
124. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 50; see McKnight & Raggio, supra note 26, at 48.
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In Allen v. Monk 25 the Texas Supreme Court gave effect to reform legis-
lation enacted in 1967 equalizing the rights and responsibilities of spouses. 26
The fact that a married woman has complete capacity to contract under sec-
tion 4.03 of the Family Code127 works a reversal of the rule in Jones v.
Goff 28 to the effect that specific performance could not be decreed against
a married woman's executory contract to sell her homestead.
Significant changes were made with respect to exempt realty through con-
stitutional amendment 129 and exempt personally by way of statute.' 30 The
constitutional amendment extends the homestead provisions to allow an ex-
emption for "a single adult person.' 13' The statutory limitation of the ex-
emption to "each single, adult person, not a constituent of a family,""132
to the extent that it may be narrower than the language of the constitution,
seems to be invalid as in derogation of a constitutional right."1 3 The statu-
tory limitation of the rural homestead exemption of a single adult to one
hundred acres, 3 4 on the other hand, is not in conflict with the constitution-
ally prescribed maximum of two hundred acres."35 The extension of consti-
tutional homestead protection to the single adult carries with it the mortgage
prohibition, thereby disposing of the contrary rule in Lacy v. Rollins1 6 with
respect to widows and widowers. It also negates the rule that the right to
claim a homestead is extinguished on divorce of a childless couple if there
is no other family relationship to perpetuate it.
If a single adult maintains a homestead in property co-owned with an-
other, as frequently occurs in the case of unmarried siblings, each may claim
the full amount of the exemption as against his or her creditors with respect
to the owner's share of the property, but this cannot occur until the single
person achieves adulthood, either by attaining the age of eighteen, by mar-
125. 505 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. 1974).
126. See Hudspeth, The Matrimonial Property Act of 1967-Six Areas of Change,
31 TEx. B.J. 477, 551-52 (1968).
127. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.03 (Supp. 1973).
.128. 63 Tex. 248 (1885).
129. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 50, 51.
130. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3836 (Supp. 1974).
131. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 50. Further suggested constitutional changes include
a provision that three-fourths of the rural homestead and the urban business homestead
be available as ordinary mortgage security and that a change from rural to urban home-
stead shall not occur without the consent of the claimant. Cf. Lauchheimer & Sons
v. Saunders, 97 Tex. 137, 76 S.W. 750 (1903). For a situation involving the difficult
question of whether a homestead is rural or urban, see First State Bank v. Brown, 490
S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973).
A revision of constitutional provisions with respect to ad valorem tax relief on home-
steads is also under consideration. With respect to tax relief for persons over 65, see
TEx. Arr'y GEN. Op. No. H-162 (1973). Nacogdoches Ind. School Dist. v. McKin-
ney, 504 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. 1974), holding in effect that the entity theory of partnership
is controlling with respect to ad valorem personal property taxes, gives added weight
to the view that a homestead cannot be claimed in partnership property. See Mc-
Knight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 31, 40
(1972).
132. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3833 (Supp. 1973).
133. The constitutional amendment became effective Dec. 13, 1973, while the stat-
ute did not become effective until Jan. 1, 1974.
134. TEx. REV. OV. STAT. ANN. art. 3833 (Supp. 1973).
135. TEX. CONsT. art. XVI, § 51.
136. 74 Tex. 566, 12 S.W. 314 (1889).
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riage, or by earlier emancipation. 3 7 But if two single adults who have pre-
viously maintained separate homesteads marry, one homestead at least must
lose its character as such, depending upon the intention of the spouses. It
may be conjectured that a single adult co-tenant of a homestead may force
partition against the other single adult co-tenant.138 It should be empha-
sized that the word "single" was meant by the draftsmen to refer to a person
who is not married and not to refer to an adult who is merely living alone.
The constitutional amendment in favor of single adults was motivated by
a sense of essential fairness.139
Whereas the recognition of individual and familial rights in land harks
back to the provisions of the constitution of 1836, the statutory revision of
the personal property exemption 140 returns to the pattern abandoned in 1870
whereby an upper limit is put on the claim of exempt personalty: $30,000
for families, $15,000 for single adults.' 4' Like the 1973 homestead amend-
ment to the constitution, the reform of the personal property exemption ex-
tends to single adults the same exemptions available to the family except
as to the maximum amount. The extension was limited to a single person
"not a constituent of a family" out of an abundance of caution to discour-
age any assertion that might be made in favor of double exemptions. The
phrase, "not otherwise entitled to exempt personal property," would have
been a happier choice of words, and it is hoped that the courts will construe
the statutory phrase as though it had been so put. Otherwise, as it stands,
the statute might exclude one of the groups it was designed to include: el-
derly spinster sisters who live together in a state of familial dependence and
own most of their personal property jointly.'42
The inclusion of "current wages" in the category of exempt properties sub-
ject to a fixed ceiling was unfortunate as it raises a possible conflict with
article XVI, section 28 of the constitution and article 4099, both of which
prohibit garnishment of wages. 43 The maximum ceiling on personal prop-
erty exemptions will not have very much effect unless the debtor owes debts
137. But see Tx. CONsT. art. XVI, § 52, with respect to the probate homestead held
on behalf of minors by their guardian.
138. Scoggins v. Taylor, 248 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1952), error
ref. See also Rettig v. Houston West End Realty Co., 254 S.W. 765 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1923), judgment adopted.
139. The equal protection argument on behalf of homesteads for single persons was
rejected in In re Statham, 483 F.2d 436 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 578, 38
L Ed. 2d 474 (1973).
140. Because TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 49, has remained unchanged, there is no con-
flict between its mandate for an exemption and the specific provisions enacted by the
legislature.
141. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3836 (Supp. 1974).
142. For a general discussion of the statutory revision, see Bateman, A Major Revi-
sion of the Texas Statutes on Debtors' Exemptions, 11 BULL. OF THE SECTION ON COR-
PORATION, BANKING & BUSINESs LAw No. 1, Oct. 1973, at 5; McKnight, Modernization
of Texas Debtor-Exemption Statutes Short of Constitutional Reform, 35 TEx. B.J. 1137
(1972). For a further note on the constitutional amendment and statutes concerning
homesteads, see Bateman, Recent Developments Relating to Texas' Homestead Exemp-
tion, 11 BULL. OF THE SECTION ON CORPORATION, BANKING & BUSINEss LAW No. 2,
Dec. 1973, at 2. For a discussion of some developments that suggested a need for leg-
islation for the protection of creditors, see McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 44, 58-59 (1969).
:143. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 28; TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4099 (1966).
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to a particular creditor in excess of the ceiling. But if the debtor is thrust
into bankruptcy or becomes a voluntary bankrupt, the question will be pre-
sented whether current wages would be subject to a turnover order. In arti-
cle 3833,144 the reference to current wages was merely harmless surplusage;
the reference in article 3836 may be troublesome surplusage. It may be
argued that though the legislature cannot allow seizure of an employee's
wages in the hands of the employer, it may nevertheless allow that amount
to be included in computing a maximum amount of exemptions for any par-
ticular debtor. But that argument seems to fail when "current wages" in
addition to other personalty owned by the debtor exceed the fixed maxi-
mum, for then the fixed maximum is completely inapplicable to the subject
matter of "current wages." The fixed maximum principle really has no ap-
plication to subject matter that is wholly exempt and subject to no limita-
tion by legislative action. It would, therefore, seem advisable at the earliest
possible time to delete the seventh category of exempt personal property in
article 3836(a) in order to dispose of this argument.
A 1972 constitutional amendment was adopted allowing the legislature to
grant exemptions from ad valorem taxes to disabled war veterans and their
dependents. 145 Enabling legislation was passed by which a surviving spouse
of a disabled veteran would be entitled to an exemption from tax on "the
first $2,500 of the assessed value of the spouse's property during the period
that the surviving spouse remains unmarried. ' 146 The attorney general ren-
dered an opinion to the effect that the provision is unconstitutional as limit-
ing that which the legislature does not have the power to limit, and since
it does not contain the normal type of severability clause, the whole statute
in which it is contained is invalid. 147
Commenting on the provisions of the old article 3832148 in a way that
would be equally applicable to the new article 3836(a), a federal district
judge remanded a dispute concerning a rice acreage allotment to the bank-
ruptcy judge with the observation that "[an acreage allotment could be
considered an implement of husbandry and given the same protection from
turnover.' 49 On remand, however, it was concluded that the allotment is
not exempt. 150
II. PARENTS AND CHILDREN
A. Status
Though at its last session the legislature declined to enact rules prescrib-
ing an orderly process for determination of paternity, there are clear rights
144. Act of April 26, 1897, ch. 101, [1897] Tex. Laws, 10 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF
TEXAS 1185 (1898) (repealed by TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3833 (Supp. 1973)).
145. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
146. TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 7150(h) (Supp. 1973).
147. TEx. ATrr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-88 (1973). See also TEX. ATr'y GEN. Op. Nos.
H-9, H-162 as to homestead tax exemptions for persons over 65.
148. Act of Jan. 6, 1841, ch. 20, § 4, [1841] Tex. Laws, 2 H. GAMMm., LAws OF
TExAs 484 (1898) (repealed 1969).
149. In re Adams, 357 F. Supp. 1184, 1187 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
150. In re Adams, 11 TEX. LAW. WEEKLY LErTER, April 24, 1974, at 17-4.
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and duties stemming from the paternal status which will necessitate findings
of a paternal relationship in the future.15' But an action of a mother of an
illegitimate child to compel law enforcement authorities to apply criminal
sanctions to the father under the criminal non-support statute, hitherto ap-
plicable under state law to fathers of legitimate children only, was unsuc-
cessful. 152 Legislation was enacted, however, to regularize status of children
born in wedlock through artificial insemination with the husband's consent.' 53
A child born subsequent to divorce but conceived during marriage
is nonetheless the legitimate child of the marriage.154  The ordinary rules
of proof of status are applicable, including the corollary of Lord Mansfield's
rule that the former husband must prove non-access in order to deny pater-
nity effectively. But there is a significant exception to the application of
Lord Mansfield's rule-if a child is conceived during marriage and after dis-
solution of that marriage the mother marries the father of the child, the hus-
band at the time of conception as well as the mother and father are allowed
to testify as to the child's paternity since the child will be the legitimate
child to someone. 55 This exception suggests a solution of a number of per-
sistent problems with respect to children born during but not of a marriage.
Formerly, article 4639a' 56 required that the names and ages of all children
"born of the marriage" sought to be dissolved by divorce be set out in the
petition. No appellate case declared this provision jurisdictional, though
some feared that it was. As long as the defense of adultery subsisted with
respect to fault grounds for divorce, attorneys frequently suppressed recitals
with respect to children born during (but admittedly not of) a marriage in
order to encourage the husband to waive service of citation and to discour-
age him from pleading the defense of adultery as a matter of lever-
age against being ordered to pay for support of the child which was admit-
tedly the biological offspring of the man the mother was about to marry.
So that the petition did not reveal the defense of adultery on its face and
therefore impel the court to apply it sua sponte, this ruse of "born of"-
"born during" was commonly practiced with an oral explanation to the judge
of the situation involved. The practice continues to be utilized under cur-
rent law. Although the Family Code does not authorize the divorce court
to waive the thirty-day period during which the parties are not allowed
to remarry, 157 the court can and frequently does encourage the parties to make
151. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973), rev'g 466 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. Civ. App.-
San Antonio 1971), error ref. n.r.e., noted in Smith, supra note 41, at 52. In past
years there have been a number of suits for proof of paternity in the Texas courts using
scientific evidence to prove or disprove paternity.
152. S. v. D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973), aff'g 335 F. Supp. 804 (N.D. Tex. 197.1).
153. Tax. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03 (Supp. 1973). Even without a statute to the
same effect, a New York court reached the same conclusion. In re Adoption of
Anonymous, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sur. Ct. 1973).
154. Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 488 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1972).
155. Caddel v. Caddel, 486 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972), noted in
Smith, supra note 41, at 45-46. See also Gravley v. Gravley, 353 S.W.2d 333 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1961), error dismissed.
156. Act of May 14, 1953, ch. 127, [1953] Tex. Laws 439 (repealed by TEx. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 3.55(a) (Supp. 1973)).
157. Tx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.66 (Supp. 1973).
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an immediate recordation of their informal marriage after the divorce is
granted. 58 Hence, the child becomes the legitimate child of the second hus-
band by operation of law, and the application of Lord Mansfield's rule is
circumvented. But the child is nonetheless still as a matter of law the legi-
timate child of the first husband as well. It is suggested that by a modest
extension of the Caddel principle (with joinder of the prospective husband
in the proceeding) the status of the child might be regularized by court de-
cree and so make unnecessary a later termination and legitimation or name
change.' 59
Though there are inevitable arguments that can be raised with respect to
its applicability in particular instances, the enactment of the statute 60 reduc-
ing the general age of majority to eighteen greatly reduces the ambit of the
related statutes allowing removal of the disabilities of minority' 6 ' and the
concept of the actually emancipated minor.162
Until January 1, 1974, the Texas law of termination of parental rights
was tied to that of adoption because the adoption code, along with the de-
pendent child statutes, 6 3 provided a means of adoption of the child of an-
other without his consent. 64 Though infant adoption will continue to be
the most common cause of judicial proceedings for termination of parental
rights, hereafter adoption and termination proceedings will be considered
separate legal concepts.
Prior to January 1, 1974, Texas had no proceeding by which parental
rights could have been finally terminated. The dependency proceeding was
as close as Texas had then come to allowing termination of parental rights.
The proceeding was subject to being reopened.' 65 A reconsideration of the
finding of dependency or neglect was available under a showing of changed
circumstances. 16  But now under chapter 15 of the Family Code termina-
158. Such advice appears to be grounded in the supposition that the proscription of
marriage in TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.66 (Supp. 1973) refers to ceremonial and not
informal marriage.
159. A father's entitlement to notice with respect to change of name of his child
was reiterated in Scucchi v. Woodruff, 503 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1973). But the court held that since there was no conflict of interest between the minor
plaintiffs and their mother, the trial court's failure to appoint a guardian ad litem for
the child was not an abuse of its discretion.
160. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5923(b) (Supp. 1973), effective Aug. 27, 1973.
161. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 31.01-.08 (Supp. 1973).
162. In TEx. ATr'y GEN. Op. Nos. H-82, H-83, H-84, H-85 (1973), the attorney
general attempted to answer some of the more immediate questions with respect to the
applicability of the legislation. See also Knag, The Connecticut Eighteen-Year-Old
Emancipation Act: Problems of Construction and Application Encountered by the Es-
tates and Trust Practitioner, 47 CONN. B.J. 147 (1973).
163. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 2330-37 (1971) (repealed 1973). See also
id. art. 46a, § 6 (1969) (repealed 1973).
164. A court declaring a child dependent and neglected need not find that the par-
ents are unfit nor need the judgment so state. Hicks v. Brooks, 504 S.W.2d 942 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1973), error ref. n.r.e. In another jurisdiction parents were found
unfit for their low mental ability. In re McDonald, 201 Iowa 447, 201 N.W. 447
(1972). With respect to the parents' right to counsel in cases of involuntary termina-
tion of parental rights, see In re Adoption of R.I., 455 Pa. 29, 312 A.2d 601 (1973);
In re Watson, 450 Pa. 579, 301 A.2d 861 (1973). See also Smith, supra note 41, at
53 n.52.
165. See Smith, supra note 41, at 53, and authorities there cited.




tion once finally decreed is irrevocable. But under section 15.05(c)(2) 1 7
courts may still make a determination that will stop short of final termina-
tion of parental rights in cases which would have merited a decree of de-
pendency or neglect but hold some possibility of changed circumstances.
Under the old law failure of support for two years by a parent was a
ground for granting adoption by another.168  Once it was held that consent
to adoption is within the discretion of the court,1 9 it was virtually inevitable
that the exercise of the court's discretion would be said to apply to judging
the unfitness of the parent to continue in that capacity as well as the desir-
ability of the adoption in spite of the parent's past acts. On several occa-
sions the appellate courts seemed to fall back on this refrain as though it
supplied added weight to the trial court's conclusion that a child might be
adopted over the objection of a non-supporting parent.170 The two-year pe-
riod of non-support did not need to be immediately prior to the judgment
in order to supply grounds for adoption in the absence of the consent of
the non-supporting parent. The fact that the non-consenting parent had re-
sumed some support during the six months immediately preceding and sub-
sequent to the filing of a petition for adoption and the fact that those bene-
fits were accepted by the other parent (and the petitioning adoptive parent)
did not affect the ground for adoption based on non-support for two years. 17'
But if the non-consenting parent resumed support within the two-year period
in a manner commensurate with his ability, the ground of non-support
failed. 72 In Alexander v. Clower 78 the non-consenting father asserted that
he had not supported his children because of an agreement that he should
not be obligated to do so. He derived this contention from language in the
mother's petition for divorce that she desired to support the children if she
remarried (which she had done), but the divorce court ordered the father
to make weekly child support payments which he paid for several months
and then stopped. The appellate court concluded that the father was not
justified in relying on any asserted representation made at the time of the
divorce.
Voluntary consent for private adoption can be withdrawn within the statu-
tory time and the petition for adoption will be dismissed.'7 4 The adoption
court cannot, however, on its own motion then proceed to declare the parent
unfit and terminate parental rights.' 75 If a child is relinquished to an au-
thorized agency to be placed for adoption, the agency's consent must be ob-
tained, even in such unusual circumstances as those giving rise to Lutheran
167. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.05(c)(2) (Supp. 1973).
168. Act of June 17, 1967, ch. 700, § 3, [1967] Tex. Laws 1819 (repealed 1973).
169. Rubey v. Kuehn, 440 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1969),
noted in McKnight, supra note 77, at 58.
170. Jackson v. Cole, 498 S.W.2d 15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973); Alexander v.
Clower, 486 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972).
171. Homfeld v. Pence, 487 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972).
172. In re Davis, 494 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973).
173. 486 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972).
174. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.06 (Supp. 1973). Under prior law withdrawal of
consent could be at any time before entry of the decree of adoption. Colwell v. Blume,
456 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1970), error ref. n.r.e.
175. Rodriguez v. Vella, 488 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1972).
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Social Service, Inc v. Ferris.76 The mother of a child born out of wedlock
relinquished the child to an authorized agency which placed the child for
adoption. Shortly afterwards the mother and her parents were killed, and
a substantial estate was left to the child. The grandfather's brother, named
as executor of his brother's will, procured an order from the district judge
directing the agency and the adoptive parents to show cause why they should
not be enjoined from proceeding with the adoption. The supreme court af-
firmed the power of the district court to issue the order. At a subsequent
hearing, the issue was whether the granduncle's petition to adopt the child
stated a cause of action. Since the petition did not state that the petitioner
had obtained the consent of the adoption agency, the appellate court con-
cluded that there was no proper petition for adoption. The couple with
whom the licensed agency had placed the child for adoption filed a plea
of privilege to be sued in their county of residence which the trial court
properly overruled, since the suit was pending in the county of residence
of the child-placing institution as provided in the adoption act.
In the latest dispute between Leithold and Plass, the father brought suit
to set aside a judgment of adoption by his former wife's second husband.
The appellate court concluded that the citation of the father by publication
was faulty.177 Under the circumstances the remedy of the non-consenting,
unserved father was to institute a suit in the nature of a bill of review which
would entitle him to a hearing on the issue of whether sufficient facts existed
to authorize the adoption. On a new trial the burden is upon -the person
petitioning for adoption to prove his case. 178 In this he ultimately failed. 179
Two cases involved rather curious situations following adoptions. In
Rodgers v. Williamson'80 the actual father of the child had been given a
right of visitation by a sister-state decree of adoption in favor of the mother's
second husband. The Supreme Court of Texas held that the foreign decree
was entitled to full faith and credit. The court went on to hold, how-
ever, that on remand to the trial court for consideration of the peti-
tioning father's prayer for a new schedule of visitation the court need
not look to either party for a showing of change of circumstances as required
for a change of custody. The trial court might therefore modify the original
order for the best interest of the child. In Avila v. Hill'8' the actual mother
of a child relinquished by her for adoption sought custody of the child after
176. 483 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972), the sequel to Lutheran Social
Serv., Inc. v. Meyers, 460 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. 1970), discussed in McKnight & Raggio,
supra note 26, at 55-56.
177. Leithold v. Plass, 488 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972).
For earlier developments, see Smith, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw.
L.J. 115, 121-23 (1968).
178. With respect to the burden of proof in a federal case to establish equitable
adoption for purposes of entitlement to Social Security benefits, the court held that a
very liberal standard of proof would be applied for such purposes when, as was the
case, the alleged adoptive parents were still living, as is usually not the case with respect
to equitable adoption. Hall v. Richardson, 362 F. Supp. 662 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
179. Leithold v. Plass, 505 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1974).
180. 489 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1973), noted in Thomas, Conflict of Laws, Annual Sur-
vey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 165, 171 (1973).
181. 497 S.W.2d 541 (Tex, Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973).
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the death of the adoptive parent. By her will the adoptive parent requested
that a particular unrelated couple take custody of the child. The trial court
concluded that granting custody to that couple was in the best interest of
the child. The Amarillo court of civil appeals affirmed this finding as within
the discretion of the trial court. The actual parent did not have any para-
mount right to custody under these circumstances.
Though the Family Code provisions enacted in 1973 clearly contemplate
both private placement and licensed agency adoptions, 8 2 the same session
of the legislature also enacted an obscure bill applying criminal sanctions
to private placement activities of lawyers, doctors, ministers, and others. 18
The attorney general has concluded184 that in spite of the apparent intend-
ment of the Family Code, the criminal statute should be literally construed.
Though lawyers and others face no risk of prosecution for engaging in place-
ment activities after termination of parental rights, their involvement prior
to that point is within the purview of the statute. It will be interesting to
see whether a way around the penal act will be found and, if not, whether
the legislature will be called upon to repeal it at its next session. 185
B. Custody and Support
There was a spate of cases during the past year involving the interest of
grandparents in custody matters. Without alleging unfitness for custody on
the part of both parents, grandparents were allowed to intervene as parties
in the discretion of the court.186 Two cases involved voluntary relinquish-
ment of custody by a parent, in one instance to grandparents and in another
to strangers. 187 In both cases the parents sought to regain custody, and in
each the court awarded custody to the non-parent on the basis of the best
interest of the child. The best interest rule was also applied in Alfaro v.
Cabrera88 in favor of a parent as against grandparents who had been
awarded custody upon the parents' divorce at a time when the parent later
seeking custody was outside the country in military service. There was no
unfitness as to the grandparents demonstrated, but there was a change in
the parent's circumstances as well as a finding that it was in the best interest
of the children to be in the custody of the parent. But in another case when
grandparents sought a change of custody from a parent, the court denied
relief to the grandparents, even to the extent of a right of visitation, and
182. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.03 (Supp. 1973).
183. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 695c, § 8 (a)12 (Supp. 1973).
184. TEx. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. H-221 (1974).
185. The attorney general has also been asked to interpret TEx. PEN. CODE ANN.
art. 606a (1952), now TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 695a, §§ 6, 7 (Supp. 1973)
with respect to bringing a child into the state for the purpose of placing him for adop-
tion. 10 TEX. LAw. WEEKLY LETTER, Nov. 21, 1973, at 45-4.
186. Perkins v. Freeman, 501 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973), error
granted. Over a dissent of Keith, J., id. at 430, the court also concluded the grand-
parents were permitted six peremptory challenges rather than three, though their inter-
ests were in many respects the same as that of their son, the father.
187. Pace v. Curtis, 496 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973);
Cravens v. Eisenbach, 487 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972).
188. Civ. Case No. 15253 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973), discussed in 10
TEx. LAw. WEEKLY LETrER, Sept. 19, 1973, at 36-3.
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even when the jury had found that visitation rights in the grandparents
would be in the best interest of the child.1 9 Though not recommended by
the Family Law Section of -the state bar, provisions allowing visitation rights
to grandparents were specifically provided in the Family Code in section
14.03(d). 90
In Davis v. Davis'1' relinquishment by the mother of custody to paternal
grandparents for a number of years was in itself treated as a significant fac-
tor in materially changed conditions to support the father's suit for a change
of custody. In that case the court's discretion was exercised along the lines
of the finding of the jury. In Brunson v. Brunson192 a clear cut case of
the constitutional validity of the binding quality of jury verdicts in custody
cases 93 was finally presented. There the jury found a material change in
living conditions of the children adversely affecting their welfare to a degree
that custody should be changed from the mother to the father. The trial
court nevertheless exercised its discretion in favor of custody of the mother,
notwithstanding the verdict.194  The Fort Worth court of civil appeals held
that there was sufficient evidence of probative force to support the verdict
and that the jury verdict was binding under the statute. The issue of con-
stitutionality of the jury verdict statute was reserved by the Texas Supreme
Court in Cook v. Wofford' 95 and might have been presented to it in this
case. But the right of jury trial in all suits affecting the parent-child rela-
tionship except adoption is provided as of January 1, 1974,196 and hence
under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act with respect to
matters to which section 11.13 of the Family Code is applicable. 197
A significant group of cases occurring during the last year also dealt with
various other questions involving rights of visitation. A proceeding for re-
adjudication of visitation rights was a separate and independent proceeding
under the old law' 95 and will continue to be so with respect to suits adjudi-
cated before January 1, 1974.99 In a contempt motion for failure to pay
189. Green v. Green, 485 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972), error ref.
n.r.e. The court purported to follow Smith v. Painter, 412 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. 1967),
where maternal grandparents were denied rights of visitation of deceased daughter's
child adopted by another.
190. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.03(d) (Supp. 1973). For further discussion of
this provision see Gault, Statutory Grandchild Visitation, 5 ST. MARYs L.J. 474 (1973);
Gault, Grandparent-Grandchild Visitation, 37 TEx. B.J. 433 (1974).
191. 499 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973).
192. 502 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973).
193. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.13 (Supp. 1973).
194. In Erwin v. Erwin, 505 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1974), the court repeated the rubric that if all factors are equal, a mother shall be
awarded custody of children of tender years. Cf. New York ex rel. Watts v. Watts,
350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1973).
195. 458 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. 1970); see McKnight & Raggio, supra note 26, at 58-59.
196. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.13 (Supp. 1973). Walker v. Showalter, 503
S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973), decided under prior law,
reached a contrary result with respect to a trial on visitation rights.
197. TEX. Ar'y GEN. Op. No. H-270 (1974). But the same is not true with re-
spect to other matters. TEX. ATrr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-218 (1974).
198. Viola v. McDougal, 498 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973), error ref.
n.r.e.
199. Act of June 15, 1973, ch. 543, § 4, [1973] Tex. Laws 1459; see Shoemate v.
Winkley, 505 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1974).
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child support the trial court cannot sua sponte undertake to change rights
of visitation. 200 A court may not condition a parent's right of visitation on
payment of child support.201 The Supreme Court of Texas reiterated the
rule that it is not necessary for either party to show the changed circum-
stances required for a change of custody in matters of visitation. 202
Under the rules applicable to custody proceedings, venue has been at the
county of residence of the respondent,20 3 and in determining which venue
rule applies the best evidence of the nature of suit is the petition praying
relief. 204 If a suit for change of custody is filed by one parent against an-
other and the respondent dies, the suit abates, leaving no suit in which the
testamentary guardian named in the deceased parent's will may defend.20 1
A suit for change of custody may also abate at the discretion of the trial
court on grounds of forum non conveniens when the foreign domiciliary
forum of the parents and child is available (and indeed petitioned by the
parties) even though the child and the petitioner were living in Texas.206
In two habeas corpus proceedings the issue was whether the child support
order was sufficiently definite for enforcement by contempt. In Ex parte
Lindeman207 the petitioner was ordered to pay a particular amount each
week for the support of the minor children of the parties until each attained
the age of eighteen years. When the eldest of the four children became
eighteen, the petitioner reduced the amount of his child support payment
by one-quarter. The Fort Worth court of civil appeals found the order "def-
inite and certain." In Ex parte Lewis20 8 the Supreme Court of Texas had
before it an order to pay a fixed amount on the first and fifteenth days
of each month until the minor children of the parties reached the age of
eighteen years. When the first of four children attained eighteen, the relator
reduced his payments by one-fourth, and thereafter when the second at-
tained that age, he paid only one-half of the amount originally ordered.
The supreme court said that this order was so vague and ambiguous that
it did not meet the requirements of Ex parte Slavin.209 One is hard put
to distinguish the orders in Lindeman and Lewis except to say that the order
in Lindeman was perhaps more ambiguous than that in Lewis. In another
proceeding it was concluded that if a trial court assesses a single cumulative
penalty for the commission of several acts asserted to be contemptuous and
any one of those acts will not support the order, the judgment is void.210
200. Johnson v. Maxwell, 493 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973).
201. Gani v. Gani, 500 S.W.2d 254 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973).
202. Rodgers v. Williamson, 489 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1973).
203. Shoemate v. Winkley, 505 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1974), which
nicely illustrates the improvements that will be affected by TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§
11.04-.06 (Supp. 1973); Box v. Fleming, 484 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1972).
204. Welty v. Welty, 496 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973).
205. Zemke v. Stevens, 494 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973); cf. Cal-
beck v. Bowen, 475 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971), discussed in Smith, su-
pra note 41, at 50.
206. Hinds v. Hinds, 491 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973).
207. 492 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973).
208. 501 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. 1973).
209. 412 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1967).
210. Ex parte Werner, 496 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antoio 1973).
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The relator had been cited for contempt for failure to pay attorney's fees,
inter alia, and it was conceded that the court had exceeded its power in this
regard.211
In Perkins v. Freeman212 the mother brought suit for change of custody
against the father. The court allowed the successful father his attorney's
fees against the mother on the basis of his duty to support the children and
the argument that if the parties had been reversed, the mother as the parent
responsible for her children's necessaries would have been entitled to attor-
ney's fees from the father. 213 The court relied on the mutual responsibility
of parents to support their children as provided in section 4.02 of the Family
Code214 and went on to say that its conclusion was bolstered by section 3a
of the Texas Bill of Rights.215
Two courts of civil appeals issued conflicting decisions with respect to the
jurisdiction of the trial court to enforce payment of arrears for child support
once the child reaches the age of eighteen. A Houston court concluded that
there is such judicial power, 210 whereas the Tyler court reached the contrary
conclusion.217  Under the amended statute, arrears for child support, pre-
sumably including that for children who have already reached the age of
eighteen, may be reduced to a judgment debt.218 Arrears under a final,
foreign decree would seem to be enforceable in this manner, if so enforce-
able by the court rendering judgment. 21 9 The power of the court to order
an increase in child support payments was not contingent on the filing of
reports accounting for past payments. 220 In Clark v. Clark221 the court re-
iterated the conclusion in Alford v. Alford222 that a reduction of child sup-
port payments for purposes of judicial enforcement will not affect the con-
tractual rights of a promisee-spouse under a divorce settlement.
211. See Ex parte Myrick, 474 S.W.2d 767, 772 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1972).
212. 501 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1973), error granted.
213. Cf. Walter v. Showalter, 503 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1973), where the petitioning parent was successiul in achieving a change.
214. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.02 (Supp. 1973).
215. TEx CONST. art. I, § 3a; see Comment, Is the Texas Equal Rights Amendment
the Answer, 15 So. TEx. L.J. 111 (1974); cf. Symposium: The New Mexico Equal
Rights Amendment-Assessing Its Impact, 3 N.M.L. REV. 1 (1973). See also Pitts-
burgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973);
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625,
634 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); TEx. A'rr'y GEN. Op. Nos. H-251, H-254
(1974); cf. Friedrich v. Katz, 341 N.Y.S.2d 932 (Sup, Ct. 1973).
216. Davidson v. Davidson, 501 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1973).
217. McCullough v. McCullough, 483 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972).
218. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.09(c) (Supp. 1973).
219. For a discussion of a related question under the pre-January 1, 1974, law, see
Brazeal v. Renner, 493 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973). See also Padfield
v. McIntosh, 267 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1954), error dismissed.
220. Act of March 19, 1935, ch. 39, § la, [1935] Tex. Laws 111 (repealed 1973),
empowered the court to require a sworn, itemized report of expenditures for child sup-
port.
221. 496 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973).
222. 487 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972), error dismissed; see Mc-
Knight, supra note 41, at 37.
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